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RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR IN AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE-
AN ANOMALY IN THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
ACCIDENT victims of commercial vehicles normally seek to recover from
financially responsible owners rather than from employee-drivers. But under
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is not liable
for the negligence of his employee unless the latter is acting within the scope
of his employment at the time of the wrongful act.1 Since the "scope of em-
ployment" test generally requires the employee to be furthering his employer's
business interest when the negligent act occurs,2 use of a vehicle by an em-
ployee for purely personal reasons usually exempts the employer from lia-
bility.3 And even where such private use may have been with the employer's
permission, he can escape liability under the doctrine.4 The most an injured
claimant can get is an often uncollectible personal judgment against the em-
ployee.5
But in practice, state statutes and accident insurance provisions facilitate
recovery for injuries caused by negligent employee-drivers.0 Statutory pro-
1. See, e.g., Riddle v. Whisnant, 220 N.C. 131, 134, 16 S.E. 2d 693, 701 (1941);
Master Auto Service Corp. v. Bowden, 179 Va. 507, 510, 19 S.E. Zd 679, 6S) (1942).
2. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Hutchins, 118 F. 2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Holder v.
Haynes, 193 S.C. 176, 187, 7 S.E. 2d 833, 838 (1940). TIFFAiY, PRINC,AL AND AGENT
106 (2d ed. 1924) ; RESTA'EmEN, AGENCY §§ 228, 235 (1933).
3. See, e.g., Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Driesbach, 30 Ala. App. 159, 4 So. 2d
180, cert. denied, 241 Ala. 668, 4 So. 2d 182 (1941). Slight deviations from the scope of
employment, however, do not necessarily relieve the employer of liability. See, e.g.,
Small v. Shull, 190 Okla. 418, 124 P. 2d 381 (1942). See Smith, Frolic ard Detour, 23
Coi. L Rv. 444, 716 (1923).
4. See, e.g., Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co. of California, 39 Cal. App. 738, 179 Pac.
697 (1919) ; Fisher v. Fletcher, 191 Ind. 529, 133 N.E. 834 (1922) ; See Montgomery v.
Hutchins, 118 F. 2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1941).
5. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidercd: The Impact of Liability Insrance,
57 Yxiz L. J. 549, 564 (1948) ; Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its Comse-
quences, 3 LAw & CoNTmp. PRoB. 466 (1936).
6. See Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 259 (1933) (criticism of respondeat superior
and discussion of statutory and common law developments broadening liability); see
James, supra note 5, at 563 (effect of insurance on recovery). The doctrine of respondeat
superior probably survives today only because various inroads upon it have removed much
of its sting. See James, sapra note 5, at 569. Grad, Recent Developments in Atwro'mbila
Accident Compensation, 50 Co. L. RE-v. 300, 305 (1950). In addition to the changes dis-
cussed in note 7 infra, one of the methods developed by state legislatures and courts to
expand common law liability and thereby achieve "ractical responsibility" has been the
use of presumptions of agency. Almost all jurisdictions have rules permitting the plain-
tiff to establish such a prima fade case or presumption from varying quanta of proof. See
Fegan, Presmnptlion versus Proof in Autonwbile Highway Accidents, 22 GEo. L. J. 750,
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visions in at least ten jurisdictions are applied to hold employers liable for
the negligence of their employees, regardless of scope of employment restric-
tions, if the vehicle is used with the employer's consent3 Moreover, "omnibus
clauses" in virtually all private and commercial accident liability policies in-
clude within their definition of "insured" any employee driving with the
consent of his employer.8 Such insurance is already widely-held,0 and the
790 (1934). For a general discussion of the various standards used, see Department of
Water and Power v. Anderson, 95 F. 2d 577, 584 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
607 (1938). Another device used to provide a financially responsible defendant in a some-
what analogous situation is the "family car doctrine." Employed in approximately half
the jurisdictions, this doctrine imposes liability upon the owner of a vehicle for the negli-
gence of members of his family when he allows them to use it. SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 665 (1942): Note, 16 NomE DAME LAW. 394,
395 (1940).
7. Such statutes generally make an owner responsible for the negligence of anyone
using a vehicle with his express or implied permission. DEXIuNO'S CALw. CODE, VEH.
CODE ANN. §402 (1948); D.C. CoDE §40-403 (1940); IDAHO CODE ANN. §49-1004
(1948) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.493 (1949) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (Supp. 1949);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (1946) ; N.Y. VEH. & TRArFIc LAW § 59 (Supp. 1951) ; RI.
GEN. LAws 1938, c. 98, § 10 (1938), as amended by Pun. LAws 1940, c. 867, § 1; Wis.
STAT. § 85.01 (la) (c) (1949).
In Florida there is no such statute. But the courts have held that under the common
law an owner is liable for the negligence of anyone using his automobile with his express
or implied permission. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629
(1920); accord, D'Allessandro v. Bechtol, 104 F. 2d 845 (5th Cir. 1939).
The combined population of these ten jurisdictions in 1950 was approximately 46,109,-
000 persons. For the United States as a whole in the same year, the total population was
149,856,000. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1950 Census of Popu-
lation, series PC-3, No. 10 (preliminary counts Apr. 1, 1950).
8. For a brief discussion of the growth and development of the "omnibus clause,"
see Drewry, The Omnibus Clause, 90 ROUGH NoTxs 32 (1947).
The typical standard private policy clause is as follows: "... (T]he unqualified word
'insured' includes the named insured and also includes any person while using the auto-
mobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided
the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission."
Travelers Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company policy, form MV, in
Yale Law Library. For the older form of this standard policy provision, see SAWYmt,
AUTOMOBILE LIABmITy INsURANcE 86 (1936).
Although not all companies writing automobile liability insurance utilize all the stand-
ard policy provisions adopted by members of the American Mutual Alliance and the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,, one authority believes that over 99 per cent
of the policies issued in the United States include a definition of insured comparable to
that given above. Communication to the YALE LAW JouPRAL from John S. Hamilton,
Jr., Assistant General Manager, American Mutual Alliance, dated November 23, 1951,
in Yale Law Library. Some states require that omnibus coverage be included in all
policies. See, e.g., CODE OF VA. § 38-238 (1950). Furthermore, most states having finan-
cial responsibility laws require that policies issued to comply with such laws carry
omnibus clauses.
Standard policies for large commercial enterprises, e.g., garages, formerly covered
only the legal liability of the named insured unless an extra premium were paid to pro-
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pressure of stricter driver's financial responsibility laws tends constantly to
increase the number of vehicles covered.' 0 As a result, accident victims neg-
ligently injured by vehicles of private businesses can generally recover.
vide extended coverage. SiuaaAx & JAmJIs, op. cit. stpra note 6, at 694. Thus coverage
for such commercial vehicles extended only to the narrow limits set by the doctrine of
respondeat superior. But progressive activity on the part of the insurance companies
themselves has led to a broadening of such policies so that now any permissive use of
such company-owned vehicles by employees is covered by the terms of the policy. See,
e.g., Travelers forms FAS (commercial), FG (garage), and SLA (comprehensive), in
Yale Law Library. The standard provisions of these policies contain essentially the same
definitions of insured as that given in the private automobile policy.
For detailed analysis of the vital role of automobile liability insurance in motor vehicle
accident compensation, see James, .stpra note 5; Grad, supra note 6.
9. While no modem nationwide figures are available on the extent of automobile
liability insurance, in Massachusetts, where there is a compulsory insurance law, all
vehicles are covered; in New York, roughly 94 per cent of the registered vehicles are
insured; in New Hampshire from S5 to 90 per cent; and in California SO per cent. Com-
munication to the YALE Law JouIm~AL from N. H. Brewster, Manager, Automobile
Division, National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, dated November 5, 1951, in Yale
Law Library. Many other states with security-type financial responsibility laws com-
parable to the New York law make estimates of insured vehicles at from 70 to 90 per
cent. Some states, however, estimate that insured vehicles are as low as 25 to 30 per
cent. Such percentage estimates apply mainly to private passenger vehicles. Commercial
vehicles in most states are subject to some form of compulsory financial responsibility
requirement and a very high percentage of such vehicles is either insured or has qualified
as a self-insurer. Communication to the YALrE Lvw JOURNAL from John S. Hamilton, Jr.,
supra note 8. In Maryland, for example, all commercial vehicles must be insured or
covered by a bond. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 56 § 182 (1939).
See also the results of an extensive market survey conducted by the Hartford Ac-
cident and Indemnity Company in 1950. Of about 23,000 private individuals contacted,
approximately 90 per cent carried automobile liability insurance. Of about 21,000 business
proprietors and managers, roughly 84 per cent held such insurance. Although this survey
was conducted on a nationwide basis, it does not necessarily represent accurate national
percentage since true polling techniques apparently were not utilized. 51 BEs-es INs.
Nrvs 35 (No. 8, 1950).
10. The percentage of insured vehicles in any state apparently jibes with the strict-
ness of its financial Tesponsibility law. In New York, for example, only about 30 pr
cent of the vehicles were insured in 1942. A year later, after the passage of a law requir-
ing drivers to furnish security when they become involved in an accident, this percentage
had jumped to about 75 per cent and has now reached approximately 94 per cent. Similar
results have been observed in other states. See Veness, Safety Responsibili y, 43 Bnsr's
Ixs. N ws 37-8 (No. 2, 1947) ; communication from NV. H. Brewster, supra note 9.
Aside from the compulsory insurance law of Massachusetts, supra note 9, financial
responsibility laws are of twvo general types: those laws requiring security when a
driver has failed to meet a judgment; those requiring security where a driver merely
becomes involved in an accident. In both cases, failure to comply results in a suspension
of the driver's license. Spottke, Pei=YIvanlia Safely Responsibility Law, 47 BrsT's Ir;s.
Nxws 41 (No. 11, 1947).
The second type of law most effectively stimulates the use of automobile insurance,
since the easiest way to comply is to have an insurance policy in effect before the acci-
dent. As a result, states desiring essentially the benefits of compulsory insurance but
19s2]
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The Federal Tort Claims Act, however, does not provide for this broadened
standard of recovery. To supplant Congressional private relief bills, inade-
quate for the claimant and burdensome for the legislature,"' as a means of
compensation for persons injured through Government employees' negligence,
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946.12 But the statute,
although apparently aiming to equalize Governmental liability for negligent
employees' acts with the liability of private employers under like circutm-
stances in the state in which the accident occurred, expressly limited the
Government's liability to negligent acts of its employees acting within the
scope of their employment. 13 And the federal courts, reading this statutory
unwilling to accept it in full have concentrated on strengthening their financial respon-
sibility laws. During the past year alone, at least twelve states (Ark., Ariz., Conn., Ga.,
Mont, N.Y., Ohio, Ore., Tenn., Texas, Utah, and W.Va.) have enacted new or more
stringent laws. 52 EAsrM-; UNDERWariER 27 (July 20, 1951).
Since the end of World War II, the increased number and strictness of financial
responsibility laws and the nation's prosperity have made automobile insurance one of
the fastest growing businesses in the country. During 1946, 1947, and 1948, the total
volume of such policies written increased over one-half billion dollars annually, 51
BEsr's INs. NEws 18 (No. 7, 1950).
11. The system of compensation through direct Congressional action was necessitated
by the unjustified doctrine of sovereign immunity. This system had for many years been
subjected to criticism as both unduly burdensome to Congress and unjust to claimants.
See SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946). In recommending that such
immunity be waived, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported that
"[t~he existing exemption [to suit] in respect to common law torts appears in-
congruous. Its only justification appears to be historical. With the expansion of
governmental activities in recent years, it becomes especially important to grant
to private individuals the right to sue the Government in respect to such torts as
negligence in the operation of vehicles." Id. at 31.
For further criticism of -the entire concept of sovereign immunity to suit, see Borch-
ard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924); Yankwich, Pro-
blems under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143, 148 (1949).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (Supp. 1951). For history of the Federal
Tort Claims Act and general analyses of its provisions, see Gottlieb, The Federal Tort
Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L. J. 1 (1946); Yankwich, Problems
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143; Comments, 56 YALE L. J. 534 (1947);
42 Il- L. REv. 344 (1947).
13. "...the district courts... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages.., for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,"
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1951).
Members of the armed forces are included within the definition of "employees," and,
for them, "acting within the scope of [their) ... employment" is defined as acting "in line
of duty." 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (Supp. 1951). Federal courts have generally treated this "line
of duty" definition as identical with "scope of employment" as applied to private em-
ployees. United States v. Campbell, 172 F. 2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1949), ccrt. denicd, 337
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restriction literally, have invoked the limitations of respondeat superior to
bar from relief claimants who, under the same circumstances, might have
recovered from private parties under broadened state law 14 or insurance
provisions.
As a result of the respondeat superior restriction, a claimant injured by
a negligent Government driver not on official business is for all practical pur-
poses left without legal redress. Suit against the driver personally not only
is often complicated by difficuties of serving process on transient Government
employees, but is fruitless when the defendant is judgment-proof.15 More-
over, though the Tort Claims Act expressly authorizes the Attorney General
to settle with a claimant,' the Government is a hard bargainer.1 - And resort
U.S. 957 (1949); United States v. Eleazer, 177 F. 2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949). Brit ef.,
Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950), 34 M.,!2. L. RM.v 225 1950-51),
where a divided court appears to have given the "line of duty" under the Tort Claims Act
a broader meaning than the local concept of "scope of employment," although the court
purported to be applying local law.
14. See Long v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (Section 403 of
CAr. VEHr. CODE, which imposes liability without regard to the doctrine of respondeat
superior, held inapplicable to the United States since it would read out of the Tort Claims
Act the qualifying phrase "while acting within the scope of his employment") ; accord,
Hubsch v. United States, 174 F. 2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. granted, 338 U.S. 814, re-
manded to district court for compromise settlcnwnt. 338 U.S. 440 (1949), cert. dis:issed,
340 U.S. 804 (1950); Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. S1 (N.D. Fla. 1948). Brt
see Clemens v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 971 (D. Minn. 1950).
15. Si cases were explored where the courts found that the government employee
involved was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time the plaintiff was
injured. In five cases there has been no compensation to date. In all five, however, no
action was brought against the driver personally. Greenwood v. United States, 97 F. Supp.
996 (D. Ky. 1951) ; Parrish v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 80 (h.D. Ga. 1950) ; Clemens
v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 971 (D. Minn. 1950); Sanchez v. United States, 177 F. 2d
452 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Fla. 1943). Three
drivers were judgment-proof (Sanchez, Greenwood, Clemens); a disputed complaint -was
served against another driver but was dropped when the court found that the driver's
negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident (Parrish). No reason was given
why there was no action against the driver in the remaining case.
Two cases reported difficulties of serving process on negligent servicemen. In one
instance, the soldier resided in another jurisdiction; in the other, process was served
on a soldier in a disputed manner when he was in the state to testify, but was dropped
on other grounds.
For full information, see communications to YALE LAw JouuRNAL from parties' coun-
sel, in Yale Law Library.
16. The Attorney General, with the approval of the court, may arbitrate, com-
promise, or settle any claim cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, after the
commencement of an action thereon." 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (Supp. 1951).
See Hubsch v. United States, 174 F. 2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. granted, 338 U.S.
814, regmanded to district court for settlenent, 338 U.S. 440 (1949), cert. d!i;:isscd, 340
U.S. 804 (1950) (allowing compromise settlement even where plaintiff lost on respondent
superior grounds in both the district court and the court of appeals).
17. In five cases explored, counsel replied on settlement. Only in one instance was
such a settlement actually effected, and that .vas after the Supreme Court had granted
19521
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to a private relief bill also seems futile.18 In one instance, the Senate Judiciary
Committee declared this road to recovery a circumvention of the Act's
intent, although the respondeat superior restriction of the Act admittedly
precluded compensation of a worthy claim.'0
certiorari. Hubsch v. United States, 174 F. 2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. granted, 338 U.S.
814, remanded to district court for settlenwnt, 338 U.S. 440 (1949), cert. dismissed, 340
U.S. 804 (1950). Another reply indicated that a settlement had been agreed upon but
was then repudiated by the Attorney General. In still another instance, tile United States
Attorney's office handling the case recommended a settlement, but the Attorney General's
office refused to agree. See cases and communications note 15 supra.
This section was originally phrased so as to allow the Attorney General to settle
claims after their commencement "with a view to doing substantial justice." 60 SrAr.
845 (1946). Although subsequent revisions have removed this terminology, its use in the
original Act suggests an intention on the part of Congress to provide for cases where
injustice or hardship would otherwise result. But apparently the provision has not been
utilized for this purpose. In one case, for example, where the father of ten minor children
was killed through the clear negligence of a soldier driving an Army truck, the Attorney
General's office refused to make even the $3,500. settlement that the plaintiff was finally
willing to accept despite the injustice involved and the clear moral obligation on the
part of the Government to provide compensation. Communication from Pierce Wood,
Attorney at Law, Dayton, Ohio, dated October 23, 1951, in Yale Law Library; Brief for
plaintiffs, p. 13, Greenwood v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
18. To implement its basic policy of eliminating most private bills, Congress de-
clared as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act that "[njo private bill... authoriz-
ing... the payment of money... for personal injuries or death for which suit may be
instituted under the Federal Tort Claims Act... shall be received or considered in either
the Senate or the House of Representatives." 60 STAT. 831 (1946). Under a ruling of
the Claims Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, a statement must be made
in the bill that the accident occurred while the federal employee was not acting within
the scope of his employment, before the bill can even be introduced. Furthermore, the
committee feels that a stronger case is presented when legal remedies have been ex-
hausted. Communication to the Honorable John J. Dempsey, United States Representative,
from Harry L. Bigbee, Attorney at Law, Santa Fe, N.M., dated January 31, 1951, dtip-
licate excerpt in Yale Law Library. Thus in cases where the question of scope of em-
ployment is in doubt, claimants may be forced to go through the expensive process of
prosecuting an unsuccessful suit before they can have a private bill introduced in their
interest.
Even where a claimant has sued the United States and been defeated on "scope of
employment" grounds, he has little prospect of compensation. Of five such cases studied,
two reported that private legislation had not been attempted. One reported that a private
bill is planned; one reported that such a bill had been introduced but had died in com-
mittee; and one reported that a private bill had been introduced but had been specifi-
cally rejected. See cases and communications note 15 supra. See also note 19 infra.
For other cases involving Government vehicles in which the issue of scope of employ-
ment was involved, see Murphey v. United States, 179 F. 2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950) (within
scope); Christian v. United States, 184 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 1950) (outside scope);
Alexander v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. S.C. 1951) (outside scope) ; Mac-
kay v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 696 (D. Conn. 1949) (outside scope) ; Lowe v. United
States, 83 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (within scope).
19. "The question here is whether a claimant who may pursue a remedy under
general legislation, but who fails to recover because of the provisions of the general legis-
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While legislative history is inconclusive, Congressional failure to harmonize
compensation under the Act with the effective recovery achieved in most
states through statutes and insurance provisions may well have been inad-
vertent. The Tort Claims Act, passed as part of the Legislative Reorgani-
zation Act of 1946, received but minor consideration by Congress at the time
of its enactment.20 Moreover, since respondeat superior has retained its vitality
in state law as to non-vehicular negligence,2 ' essentially identical criteria
determine recovery from the Government and private employers in such
cases covered by the Act. Only as to automobile accident compensation have
state statutes and insurance practice undermined "scope of employment" as
a basis of recovery for negligent injury.2 Thus, only in motor vehicle negli-
gence cases has the Act failed to realize the Congressional purpose of placing
the United States in the same position as a private employer.2 In fact, a
lation, may then successfully look to the Congress for relief. In brief the question is
whether the Congress shall pay claims for injuries caused by the wrongful act or omis-
sion of the United States in a case when the employee is not acting within the scope of
his office or employment.
"It is the belief of your comnmittee that Congress expressed its intent in the general
legislation and that this claimant should not be permitted to circumvent such intent by
private legislation, but rather the remedy is in the proper amending of the over-all general
law. In addition, it appears the claimant has had his day in court."
Report to accompany S. 483, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949). Confidential Committee Print, p. 3. The bill was introduced on behalf of
a claimant in a case where the court said a private employer under the same circumstances
would have been liable. Copper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. S1, R2 (N.D. Fla. 1943).
20. The basic purpose of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was to provide
for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the Government. Since a major portion
of the Act was devoted to organizational changes in Congress, most of the legislators'
attention was focused upon that problem. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946) (only four pages of 40-page report devoted to Tort Claims Act) ; 92 Coxa.
Rc. 10092 (1946) (practically no debate on Tort Claims Act in House of Representa-
tives at time of passage). There were no hearings in 1946 on the tort claims provisions.
But similar bills had been considered at earlier times by committees in both houses.
See, e.g., Hearings before the Cnmnittee on the Ji dicar, on HR. 5373 and H.R. 673.
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ; SEN. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). Even in
such earlier considerations, however, the issue of broadened recovery in private automobile
cases does not appear to have been brought to the attention of Congress.
21. See Note, 2 A.LR. 2d 413 (1948); 35 Ai. Jur. 985.
22. See p. xxx supra.
23. "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relat-
ing to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for
punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1951).
See the remark of Mr. Scrivner in the House of Representatives at the time of pass-
age of the Act that "[i]f I read this language correctly, the recovery will be against the
Government just exactly as against the private individual." 92 Co:tG. RLE. 1V 12 (1946).
See also Young v. United States, 1,i4 F. 2d 587, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Rushfurd v. United
States, 92 F. Supp. 874, 876 (N.D. N.Y. 1950).
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somewhat similar statutory flaw was remedied in 1947 to permit recovery
against the Government where, because of peculiar state law, literal reading
of the Act had precluded it.
24
To ensure victims of negligent Government drivers a chance of recovery
at least equal to suit against private parties, Congress should further amend
the Tort Claims Act.2 5 Elimination of the scope of employment restriction
would make Governmental and private legal liability coextensive under state
law. But such a change would not be enough to make recovery opportunity
commensurate with that in cases involving private employers; claimants would
still be deprived of the recovery benefits of "omnibus clauses" in automobile
accident insurance policies. Short of accepting absolute liability, Congress
by incorporating into the Act doctrines common in local practice could as-
sure recovery in most vehicular negligence cases. Congress, for example,
could apply to the Government the agency provisions of the District of
Columbia Financial Responsibility Law 20 it once enacted to broaden the basis
of private liability. Under that statute, express or implied consent by the
owner to another's use of a vehicle is the basis of vicarious liability, and
ownership is prima facie evidence of consent.2 7 But since by law Government
vehicles may be driven only on official business,28 this technicality might be
held to rebut consent narrowly interpreted. Hence, Congress should also en-
act a broad definition of consent. Under a frequent state interpretation, the
24. The original Act declared that the United States should not be liable for punitive
damages. But Alabama and Massachusetts allowed exclusively punitive damages for
wrongful homicide. In recommending passage of an amendment that would allow the
Government to be sued for compensatory damages in such states, the House Judiciary
Committee reported that "[i]ts passage will remove an unjust discrimination never in.
tended, but which works a complete denial of remedy for wrongful homicide," (Emphasis
added.) H.R. Rrv. No. 748, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
25. Prompt action is desirable because of the great number of government vehicles
now in operation. In 1950, there were 81,666 vehicles operated in the United States by
civilian federal agencies. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Table MV-7,
1950 (April, 1951). As of June 30, 1949, there were 102,205 military vehicles operating
on United States highways. Although the number of such military vehicles fell to 79,665
by January, 1950, presumably it will again grow as the armed forces expand. Communli-
cation to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from Philip F. Hines, Assistant to the Deputy Director,
Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, dated November 19, 1951, in Yale
Law Library.
26. D.C. CODE § 40-403 (1940).
27. Ibid. See Forrester v. Jerman, 90 F. 2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (statute substi-
tuted consent for respondeat superior as basis of liability) ; Rosenberg v. Murray, 116
F. 2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (proof of ownership shifts to defendant the burden of proving
a lack of consent).
28. 59 STAT. 132 (1945), 5 U.S.C. § 78(c)(2) (1946); see also 32 C.F.R. §634.1
(Supp. 1950) (comparable Army regulation). But the law is not always observed. See,
e.g., remarks by Senator Bridges, 92 CoNG. REc. 6559 (1946) ("... Congress should take
steps to find out why the law is not being lived up to...").
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owner's mere initial permission 29 to use a vehicle is held sufficient consent
to impose liability upon him even for the driver's subsequent unauthorized
actions. 30 Under this "initial permission" test, once the Government checked
out a vehicle to a driver, liability for his negligence on unauthorized depar-
tures from official business would automatically follow. In effect, the Govern-
ment would assume accident responsibility for the negligent use of its vehicles
in virtually any case short of conversion.3 ' This test not only best protects
the public by a broad rule of liability but furnishes the most objective standard
for a determination of consent. 32 Under such statutory provisions basing lia-
bility on consent broadly defined, Government vehicular responsibility, al-
though not strictly following each individual state practice, 33 would assure
tort claimants recovery results approximating those realized against private
parties under advanced state law and insurance practice.
Liability for vehicular negligence is a recognized expense in any large enter-
prise. By accepting a realistic degree of responsibility for the consequences
of negligent use of its vehicles, the Government would merely be serving in
29. "Initial" permission refers to that permission given to a driver in the first in-
stance to use the vehicle, as distinguished from the further problem of whether he has
permission for the actual use he may subsequently make of the vehicle. See Hodges v.
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 435, 18 S.E. 2d 2S, 31 (1941), ccrt.
denied, 316 U.S. 693 (1942). Such initial permission may be either given by express grant
or may be implied from usage and practice of the parties prior to the accident. See, e.g.,
Farmer v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company, 11 F. Supp. 542, 543 (M.D.
Ala. 1935) (express permission) ; Maryland Casualty Company v. Ronan, 37 F. 2d 449,
450 (2nd Cir. 1930) (implied permission). See Hinton v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 175 Va.
205, 214, 8 S.E. 2d 279, 281 (1940).
30. See, e.g., Jefson v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 293 111. App. 97, 11 N.E.
2d 993 (1937) ; Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938) ; Stovall v. New York
Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W. 2d 473 (1928). Cf. Boggs Y. Butler, 129 Fla. 324,
327, 176 So. 174, 176 (1937).
31. See Wilson v. Farnsworth, (La. App.) 4 So. 2d 247, 250 (1941).
32. See Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 314, 8 SAV. 2d 473, 477
(1928); Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 858, 181 So. 191, 194 (1938).
33. In addition to the most advanced "initial permission" test described above, vhich
is utilized in quite a number of jurisdictions, there are two other tests used in state
practice. Some states hold that such initial permission is sufficient to constitute consent
so long as the employee's conduct involves no more than a "slight deviation!' from such
permission. See, e.g., Hodges v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431,
436, 18 S.E. 2d 28, 32 (1941), cert. decid, 316 U.S. 693 (1942); Fritz Anderson v.
Standard Oil Co., and Another, 204 Minn. 337, 2,3 N.W. 571 (1939); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 186 Va. 658, 43 S.E. 2d 863 (1947). A few courts, however, hold
that the actual use of the vehicle at the time of the accident must be the one for which
initial permission was given before they will find consent. See, e.g., Johnson v. American
Auto. Ins. Company, 131 Me. 288, 161 Atl. 496 (1932); Sauriolle v. O'Gorman, 26 N.H.
39, 163 Atl. 717 (1932). For discussion of these three tests and extensive case citation,
see Notes 5 A.L.R. 2d 600 (1949) ; 159 A.L.R. 1309 (1945); see alsu Miller, The Omni-
bus Clause, 15 TULANE L. REy. 422, 424 (1941).
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the capacity of its own insurer.3 4 The cost of Governmental vehicular neg-
ligence would be distributed to all the nation's taxpayers rather than thrust
upon the individual accident victim.
34. By thus serving as its own insurer, the Government would also provide greater
protection for its employees. The increased liability of the United States would reduce
any incentive to sue the negligent employee personally. Furthermore, under the Act, re-
covery from the Government bars any additional claim against the employee. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2627 (Supp. 1951). Like other employers, the Government would still have a right of
action against the employee involved. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Col.,
161 U.S. 316, 327 (1896). As in the case of railroads and other large enterprises, how-
ever, it is improbable that this right would ever be exercised.
